Catarina Dutilh Novaes
University of Groningen, Faculty of Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Philosophy of Logic, Philosophy, Logic, Medieval logic, Philosophy Of Language, History of Philosophy of Science, and 12 moreMedieval Philosophy, Philosophy Of Mathematics, Analytic Philosophy, History of Analytic Philosophy, Logical Consequence, Epistemology of logic, Proof-Theoretic Semantics, Philosophical Logic, Epistemology, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, History of Logic, and History of Philosophyedit
- Research interests: history and philosophy of logic, cognition, psychology of reasoning, cognitive science, medieval logic, philosophy of science and mathematics.edit
Table of Contents Modality, Intentionality and Discursive Practice Pragmatism, Inferentialism and Modality in Sellars's Arguments against Empiricism Robert Brandom p. 6 Brandom's Five-Step Program for Modal Health Fredrik Stjernberg p. 18... more
Table of Contents Modality, Intentionality and Discursive Practice Pragmatism, Inferentialism and Modality in Sellars's Arguments against Empiricism Robert Brandom p. 6 Brandom's Five-Step Program for Modal Health Fredrik Stjernberg p. 18 The Status of Intentional Vocabulary in Discursive Practice: Reading Making it Explicit in the Light of" Between Saying and Doing" David Lauer p. 23 Logic, Semantics and the Theory of Meaning Inferentialism and the Normativity of Meaning Jaroslav Peregrin p.
Research Interests:
(Forthcoming in Synthese) Explication is the conceptual cornerstone of Carnap’s approach to the methodology of scientific analysis. From a philosophical point of view, it gives rise to a number of questions that need to be addressed,... more
(Forthcoming in Synthese)
Explication is the conceptual cornerstone of Carnap’s approach to the
methodology of scientific analysis. From a philosophical point of view, it gives rise
to a number of questions that need to be addressed, but which do not seem to have
been fully addressed by Carnap himself. This paper reconsiders Carnapian explication
by comparing it to a different approach: the ‘formalisms as cognitive tools’ conception
(Formal languages in logic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012a). The
comparison allows us to discuss a number of aspects of the Carnapian methodology, as
well as issues pertaining to formalization in general. We start by introducing Carnap’s
conception of explication, arguing that there is a tension between his proposed criteria
of fruitfulness and similarity; we also argue that his further desideratum of exactness is
less crucial than might appear at first. We then bring in the general idea of formalisms
as cognitive tools, mainly by discussing the reliability of so-called statistical prediction
rules (SPRs), i.e. simple algorithms used to make predictions across a range of areas.
SPRs allow for a concrete instantiation of Carnap’s fruitfulness desideratum, which is
arguably the most important desideratum for him. Finally, we elaborate on what we
call the ‘paradox of adequate formalization’, which for the Carnapian corresponds to
the tension between similarity and fruitfulness. We conclude by noting that formalization
is an inherently paradoxical enterprise in general, but one worth engaging in
given the ‘cognitive boost’ it affords as a tool for discovery.
Explication is the conceptual cornerstone of Carnap’s approach to the
methodology of scientific analysis. From a philosophical point of view, it gives rise
to a number of questions that need to be addressed, but which do not seem to have
been fully addressed by Carnap himself. This paper reconsiders Carnapian explication
by comparing it to a different approach: the ‘formalisms as cognitive tools’ conception
(Formal languages in logic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012a). The
comparison allows us to discuss a number of aspects of the Carnapian methodology, as
well as issues pertaining to formalization in general. We start by introducing Carnap’s
conception of explication, arguing that there is a tension between his proposed criteria
of fruitfulness and similarity; we also argue that his further desideratum of exactness is
less crucial than might appear at first. We then bring in the general idea of formalisms
as cognitive tools, mainly by discussing the reliability of so-called statistical prediction
rules (SPRs), i.e. simple algorithms used to make predictions across a range of areas.
SPRs allow for a concrete instantiation of Carnap’s fruitfulness desideratum, which is
arguably the most important desideratum for him. Finally, we elaborate on what we
call the ‘paradox of adequate formalization’, which for the Carnapian corresponds to
the tension between similarity and fruitfulness. We conclude by noting that formalization
is an inherently paradoxical enterprise in general, but one worth engaging in
given the ‘cognitive boost’ it affords as a tool for discovery.
Research Interests:
(Forthcoming in dialectica) The paper argues that much of the difficulty with making progress on the issue of the normativity of logic for thought, as discussed in the literature, stems from a misapprehension of what logic is normative... more
(Forthcoming in dialectica)
The paper argues that much of the difficulty with making progress on the issue of the normativity of logic for thought, as discussed in the literature, stems from a misapprehension of what logic is normative for. The claim is that, rather than mono-agent mental processes, (deductive) logic in fact comprises norms for quite specific situations of multi-agent dialogical interactions, in particular special forms of debates. This reconceptualization is inspired by historical developments in logic and mathematics (briefly surveyed in the paper), in particular the pervasiveness of such dialogical conceptions in the early days of logic in ancient Greece. The multi-agent, dialogical perspective then allows for the formulation of compelling ‘bridge principles’ between the relation of logical consequence and dialogical normative principles, something that is notoriously difficult to achieve in a mono-agent setting pertaining exclusively to thought and belief. The upshot is also that the truth-preserving rules of logic generally do not have a primary normative bearing on mono-agent mental processes, and in this sense the paper sides with Harman’s (1986, 2009) critique of the idea that logic has a normative import for thought and belief.
The paper argues that much of the difficulty with making progress on the issue of the normativity of logic for thought, as discussed in the literature, stems from a misapprehension of what logic is normative for. The claim is that, rather than mono-agent mental processes, (deductive) logic in fact comprises norms for quite specific situations of multi-agent dialogical interactions, in particular special forms of debates. This reconceptualization is inspired by historical developments in logic and mathematics (briefly surveyed in the paper), in particular the pervasiveness of such dialogical conceptions in the early days of logic in ancient Greece. The multi-agent, dialogical perspective then allows for the formulation of compelling ‘bridge principles’ between the relation of logical consequence and dialogical normative principles, something that is notoriously difficult to achieve in a mono-agent setting pertaining exclusively to thought and belief. The upshot is also that the truth-preserving rules of logic generally do not have a primary normative bearing on mono-agent mental processes, and in this sense the paper sides with Harman’s (1986, 2009) critique of the idea that logic has a normative import for thought and belief.
Research Interests:
Elqayam and Evans’ critique of normativism is related to an inherently philosophical question: is thinking a normative affair? Should thinking be held accountable towards certain norms? I present the historical and philosophical origins... more
Elqayam and Evans’ critique of normativism is related to an inherently philosophical question: is thinking a normative affair? Should thinking be held accountable towards certain norms? I present the historical and philosophical origins of the view that thinking belongs to the realm of normativity and has a tight connection with logic, stressing the pivotal role of Kant in these developments.
The paper investigates the propriety of applying the form versus matter distinction to arguments and to logic in general. Its main point is that many of the currently pervasive views on form and matter with respect to logic rest on... more
The paper investigates the propriety of applying the form versus matter distinction to arguments and to logic in general. Its main point is that many of the currently pervasive views on form and matter with respect to logic rest on several substantive and even contentious assumptions which are nevertheless uncritically accepted. Indeed, many of the issues raised by the application of this distinction to arguments seem to be related to a questionable combination of different presuppositions and expectations; this holds in particular of the vexed issue of demarcating the class of logical constants. I begin with a characterization of currently widespread views on form and matter in logic, which I refer to as ‘logical hylomorphism as we know it’—LHAWKI, for short—and argue that the hylomorphism underlying LHAWKI is mereological. Next, I sketch an overview of the historical developments leading from Aristotelian, non-mereological metaphysical hylomorphism to mereological logical hylomorphism (LHAWKI). I conclude with a reassessment of the prospects for the combination of hylomorphism and logic, arguing in particular that LHAWKI is not the only and certainly not the most suitable version of logical hylomorphism. In particular, this implies that the project of demarcating the class of logical constants as a means to define the scope and nature of logic rests on highly problematic assumptions.
We investigate the philosophical significance of the existence of different semantic systems with respect to which a given deductive system is sound and complete. Our case study will be Corcoran’s deductive system D for Aristotelian... more
We investigate the philosophical significance of the existence of different semantic systems with respect to which a given deductive system is sound and complete. Our case study will be Corcoran’s deductive system D for Aristotelian syllogistic and some of the different semantic systems for syllogistic that have been proposed in the literature. We shall prove that they are not equivalent, in spite of D being sound and complete with respect to each of them. Beyond the specific case of syllogistic, the goal is to offer a general discussion of the relations between informal notions—in this case, an informal notion of deductive validity—and logical apparatuses such as deductive systems and (model-theoretic or other) semantic systems that aim at offering technical, formal accounts of informal notions. Specifically, we will be interested in Kreisel’s famous ‘squeezing argument’; we shall ask ourselves what a plurality of semantic systems (understood as classes of mathematical structures) may entail for the cogency of specific applications of the squeezing argument. More generally, the analysis brings to the fore the need for criteria of adequacy for semantic systems based on mathematical structures. Without such criteria, the idea that the gap between informal and technical accounts of validity can be bridged is put under pressure.
Two periods in the history of logic and philosophy are characterized notably by vivid interest in self-referential paradoxical sentences in general, and Liar sentences in particular: the later medieval period (roughly from the 12th to the... more
Two periods in the history of logic and philosophy are characterized notably by vivid interest in self-referential paradoxical sentences in general, and Liar sentences in particular: the later medieval period (roughly from the 12th to the 15th century) and the last 100 years. In this paper, I undertake a comparative taxonomy of these two traditions. I outline and discuss eight main approaches to Liar sentences in the medieval tradition, and compare them to the most influential modern approaches to such sentences. I also emphasize the aspects of each tradition that find no counterpart in the other one. It is expected that such a comparison may point in new directions for future research on the paradoxes; indeed, the present analysis allows me to draw a few conclusions about the general nature of Liar sentences, and to identify aspects that would require further investigation.
Some fourteenth-century treatises on paradoxes of the liar family offer a promising starting-point for the formulation of full-fledged theories of truth with systematic relevance in their own right. In particular, Bradwardine's thesis... more
Some fourteenth-century treatises on paradoxes of the liar family offer a promising starting-point for the formulation of full-fledged theories of truth with systematic relevance in their own right. In particular, Bradwardine's thesis that sentences typically say more than one thing gives rise to a quantificational approach to truth, and Buridan's theory of truth based on the notion of suppositio allows for remarkable metaphysical parsimony. Bradwardine's and Buridan's theories both have theoretical advantages, but fail to provide a satisfactory account of truth because both are committed to the thesis, fatal for both, that every sentence signifies/implies its own truth. I close with remarks on Greg Restall's recent model-theoretic formalization of Bradwardine's theory of truth.
Fourteenth-century treatises on paradoxes of the liar family, especially Bradwardine's and Buridan's, raise issues concerning the meaning of sentences, in particular about closure of sentential meaning under implication, semantic... more
Fourteenth-century treatises on paradoxes of the liar family, especially Bradwardine's and Buridan's, raise issues concerning the meaning of sentences, in particular about closure of sentential meaning under implication, semantic pluralism and the ontological status of ‘meanings’, which are still topical for current theories of meaning. I outline ways in which they tend to be overlooked, raising issues that must be addressed by any respectable theory of meaning as well as pointing in the direction of possible answers. I analyse a Bradwardinian theory of sentential meaning as it emerges from his treatment of liar sentences, exploring where it requires more thorough elaboration if it is to be a fully developed theory of sentential meaning.